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COMMENT 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IS INSUFFICIENT: 
MINORS' DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO 
PARTICIPATE WITH COUNSEL WHEN 
DIVORCE CUSTODY DISPUTES INVOLVE 
ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD ABUSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In divorce proceedings, the parental custody decision must 
reflect the best interests of the child. 1 Both the court and the 
parents have an obligation to act in the child's interests.2 Ide-
ally, the parents cooperate and the child need not participate 
in the action.3 However, in contested custody proceedings, 
1. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.20.090 (1991). Various factors considered in 
awarding custody include the child's preference, the stability of the home 
environment likely to be offered by each parent, and any evidence of domestic 
violence, child abuse, or child neglect in the proposed custodial household or a 
history of violence between the parents. See id. 
2. See Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925), where Judge Cardozo 
expressed the basis for custody decisions: "The Chancellor in exercising his juris-
diction upon petition does not proceed upon the theory that the petitioner, whether 
father or mother, has a cause of action against ... anyone. He acts as parens 
patriae to do what is best for the interests of the child." Id. But see Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n.36 
(1977) (acknowledging that "judges . . . may find it difficult, in utilizing vague 
standards like 'the best interests of the child,' to avoid decisions resting on [their) 
subjective values"); Emile R. Kruzick & David H. Zemans, In the Best Interests of 
the Child: Mandatory Independent Representation, 69 DEN. U.L. REV. 605, 606 
(1992) <concluding that the best interest test cannot be determined without inde-
pendent representation for the child); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re·Expressing Parent· 
hood, 98 YALE. L.J. 293, 303 (1988) (noting that the best interests of the child 
standard reflects societal judgments rather than individualized fact-finding into the 
child's relationships). 
3. See In re William T., 218 Cal. Rptr. 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1985), where the 
513 
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parental cooperation can deteriorate, and the court must strug-
gle to determine the child's best interests.4 Counsel for the 
parents cannot represent both the child's best interests and the 
interests of their clients when those interests are divergent. 6 
Thus, the judge must perform the passive role of arbiter be-
tween the parents and, at the same time, protect the child's 
interests under the doctrine of parens patriae.6 To ensure that 
the child's interests receive priority in the midst of other com-
peting interests, courts have discretion to appoint an indepen-
dent representative for the child.7 
Many commentators argue that the fundamental fairness 
of due process requires appointment of counsel for the child in 
all contested custody cases.8 These commentators believe that 
court noted that in most custody proceedings, the child depends upon others to 
represent her best interests. The child is normally not a party to the action, which 
is viewed as a civil action determining the right of parents. Id. A dependency pro· 
ceeding adds the interest ·of the state, as the guardian for the child. Id. 
4. See JUDGE BERNARD BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273 (1952) (commenting' that 
"[a) judge agonizes more about reaching the right result in a contested custody 
issue than about any other type of decision he renders"); see also Flores v. Flores, 
598 P.2d 893, 896 (Alaska 1979) (finding that "the crucial determination of what 
will be best for the child can be an exceedingly difficult one as it requires a deli-
cate process of balancing many complex and competing considerations that are 
unique to every case"); Jessica Pearson & Maria A. Luchesi Ring, Judicial Deci· 
sion-Making in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703, 722·23 (1982·83) (cit· 
ing judges' statements that the importance and the unavailability of facts makes 
custody determinations troublesome); Robert H. Mnookin, Child·Custody Adjudica· 
tion: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
226, 229 (1975) (stating that "the determination of what is 'best' ... for a partic-
ular child is usually indeterminate and speculative"). 
5. Maurice K. C. Wilcox, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce 
Custody Proceedings, 27 HAsTINGS L.J. 917, 924 (1976) (emphasizing that the 
parent's attorney has a duty to his client to minimize the effect of evidence of 
parental unfitness, even when this conflicts with the best interests of the child). 
6. Id. at 921. "Parens Patriae, literally 'parent of the country,' refers tradi-
tionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a 
legal disability to act for themselves such as juveniles, the insane, or the un-
known." West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
7. See Judge Robert W. Hansen, Guardians Ad Litem in Divorce and Custody 
Cases: Protection of the Child's Interests, 4 J. FAM. L. 181, 183 (1964) (relying on 
the "inherent power of the court to implement . . . concern for the welfare of the 
child" through the power of appointment). 
8. See, e.g., Howard Davidson, The Child's Right to be Heard and Represented 
in Judicial Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 255 (1991); James K. Genden, Separate 
Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in 
Judicial Proceedings, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 564 (1976); Judge Robert W. 
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the circumstances surrounding contested custody disputes lead 
to inadequate proceedings when a single voice does not speak 
solely for the child.9 This rationale is even stronger when alle-
gations of child abuse are present. 10 
This comment will illustrate how allegations of child 
abusell in a divorce custody dispute12 dramatically alter the 
presumption that the child's interests are well represented. 
Therefore, appointment of counsel for the child becomes neces-
sary. The author first summarizes current state laws which 
address this issue13 and discusses the factors which cause 
discretionary appointment to fail. 14 Next, the author demon-
strates the trend of appellate court decisions and state laws 
toward mandatory appointment of counsel when abuse is al-
leged.15 The author then argues that mandatory appointment 
Hansen, Guardians Ad Litem in Divorce and Custody Cases: Protection of the 
Child's Interests, 4 J. FAM. L. 181 (1964) (discussing the appointment of an attor-
ney guardian by Wisconsin judicial decree in every case with disputed custody or 
concern for the child's welfare); Monroe L. Inker & Charlotte A. Perretta, A 
Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAM. L.Q. 108 (1971); Paul K 
Milmed, Due Process for Children: A Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings, 4 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 177 (1974); Ralph J. Podell, The "Why" Behind 
Appointing Guardians Ad Litem for Children in Divorce Proceedings, 57 MARQ. L. 
REv. 103 (1973); Maurice K. C. Wilcox, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in 
Divorce Custody Proceedings, 27 HAsTINGS L.J. 917 (1976). 
9. See In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79, 86 (Mont. 1985), where the court 
observed that the child custody dispute presents a "unique situation because the 
child, although not a party to the action, is the person most affected by the ac-
tion." The child lacks maturity to either determine or represent her own best 
interests. Id. 
10. See Kerin S. Bischoff, The Voice of the Child: Independent Legal Represen-
tation of Children in Private Custody Disputes When Sexual Abuse is Alleged, 138 
U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1388 (1990). 
11. Child abuse is typically defined by statute as "inflicting or causing physical 
or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the physical or mental health or 
welfare of a child other than by accidental means, including abandonment, exces-
sive or unreasonable corporal punishment, malnutrition or substantial risk thereof 
by reason of intentional or unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing 
the commission of a sexual offense against a child as defined by law . . . ." WYO. 
STAT. § 14-3-202(ii) (1994). 
12. Most allegations of abuse in custody disputes involve sexual abuse and 
about half of the sexual abuse allegations involve the child's father. Nancy 
Thoennes & Jessica Pearson, Summary of Findings from the Sexual Abuse Allega-
tions Project, SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 20, 
21 (1988). 
13. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 23-77 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 78-100 and accompanying text. 
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is necessitated by due process balancing of the child's and the 
government's interest.16 Finally, the author highlights a cus-
tody proceeding's similarity to dependency and termination 
proceedings where representation is guaranteed.17 
II. CURRENT TREATMENT OF CHILD ABUSE 
ALLEGATIONS 
Presently, only one state requires appointment of a repre-
sentative for the child in all disputed custody cases. IS Four 
states have determined that allegations of child abuse or ne-
glect always require appointment of a child's representative. 19 
Most other states permit the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem20 or counsel for the child at the discretion of the 
court.21 Nevertheless, for various reasons, judges rarely decide 
16. See infra notes 101·50 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 151-59 and accompanying text. 
18. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (West Supp. 1994) (providing for appointment of 
a guardian ad litem in all contested custody cases and when "the court has special 
concern as to the welfare of the child"). The guardian functions in the same man-
ner as a party to the action. ld.; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(1I)(b) 
(Supp. 1994), which was modified from mandatory to discretionary appointment. 
19. MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.423 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (requiring appointment of a 
"guardian ad litem in any proceeding in which abuse or neglect is alleged"); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 415.508 (West 1993) (requiring appointment at the earliest possible 
time in any child abuse or neglect proceeding); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.165(2) 
(West 1990) (requiring appointment of a guardian ad litem in all custody or visita-
tion proceedings "if the court has reason to believe that the minor child is a vic-
tim of domestic violence or neglect"). Connecticut requires appointment by judicial 
precedent. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. 
20. This Comment does not discuss the differences between counsel and the 
position of guardian ad litem, which has many variations in different states from 
an attorney having the full rights of counsel to a lay person, filing a report but 
having no investigative duties. 
21. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3150(a) (West 1994) (providing for appointment 
of private counsel upon court finding that appointment would be in child's best 
interests); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-54 (1986) (allowing for appointment of counsel); 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-918(b) (1989) (providing for appointment of an attorney); 
HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-46(8) (Supp. 1992) (providing for appointment of guardian 
ad litem); MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 215, § 56A (West 1989) (providing for ap-
pointment of guardian ad litem for investigative purposes); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
598.12 (West Supp. 1994) (allowing for appointment of an attorney to represent 
the interests of the child); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.110 (West Supp. 1995) 
(allowing for appointment of attorney if in the child's best interests). The Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act permits the appointment of an attorney in private custo-
dy disputes to act as an advocate on behalf of the child. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DI-
VORCE ACT § 310, 9A U.L.A. 443 (1987). 
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appointment is necessary.22 
III. WHY JUDICIAL DISCRETION IS INADEQUATE WHEN 
ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD ABUSE EXIST 
When appointment of counsel is discretionary, in each 
custody proceeding the court must make a determination of the 
adequacy of the child's representation.23 This case-by-case as-
sessment of due process can degenerate into a standard finding 
of adequacy based upon the court's preconceived notions.24 
Instead of developing pretrial procedures and standards to 
determine the need for counsel, judges are likely to be predis-
posed towards a single determination.25 Because judges rarely 
have before them all of the facts concerning abuse, decisions 
are often fashioned to serve the interests of parents or the 
22. Linda D. Elrod, Counsel for the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time is 
Now, 26 FAM. L.Q. 53, 56 (1992). Various reasons for the refusal to appoint in-
clude: judicial attempts to streamline procedures, added court costs for the par-
ents, lack of competence of available guardians ad litem, and a belief that the 
child's interests are already adequately protected. [d. Because appointment is dis-
cretionary, the judge's decision is rarely overturned. [d. See infra notes 23-77 and 
accompanying text for a discussion regarding the inadequacy of judicial discretion. 
23. See Mistretta v. Mistretta, 566 So. 2d 836, 837-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1990). In Mistretta, the court found that the wife's interest in obtaining child sup-
port coincided with the best interests of the child and, thus, the child's representa-
tion was adequate. [d. at 838. The court noted that Florida law requires no ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem if "the interest of the minor will be fully pro-
tected throughout an action." [d. at 837 (citing FLA. RULES OF CIV. P., Rule 
1.210(b». The court noted further that the child has due process rights when the 
interests of the child may be adverse to the interests of the parent. [d. at 837-38 
(citing Johns v. Department of Justice, 624 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1980». The Court of 
Appeals in Johns remanded for appointment of counsel for the child where the 
parties could not adequately represent the infant in a hearing to deport the infant 
to her natural mother. Johns, 624 F.2d at 524. 
A right to counsel also guarantees the child's right to counsel of choice. 
Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1975) (allowing a minor's re-
tained counsel of choice over parents' objection in a dependency matter); Akkiko 
M. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Ct. App. 1985) (obligating the court to 
honor minor's counsel of choice in a dependency hearing if the minor is competent 
to choose an attorney and chooses competent counsel). 
24. JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST 
INTEREST OF THE CHILD, 54 (1973) !hereinafter GoLDSTEIN, ET AL.J (contending 
that the "best interest test" is a misnomer). 
25. Id. 
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general policies of administrative agencies.26 
A. THE FAILURE TO FuLLY INQUIRE INTO FACTS OF ABUSE 
One reason why judges may not have enough information 
to adequately exercise their discretion is that often the parents 
themselves discourage investigation of abuse.27 Normally, 
when accused of child abuse, one parent seeks to discredit any 
allegations of abuse while at the same time requesting some 
custody or visitation arrangement.28 The other parent may 
have reasons not to fully explore the facts of alleged abuse as 
well. For example, the other parent may be involved in the 
abuse or subject to spousal abuse.29 Often, one parent may 
fabricate charges of abuse to prolong or modify the custody 
decision30 despite the imposition of penalties for false allega-
tions.31 
In addition to the parents, the court itself may proceed in 
a manner which discourages exploration of the allegations of 
abuse. Although the court has a duty to gather evidence in the 
absence of a diligent effort by parents,32 the family court often 
26. [d. See infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text for an explanation of why 
the interests of parents and the state often overshadow the interests of the child. 
27. See Leigh v. Aiken, 311 So. 2d 444, 448 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975) (recognizing 
that parental motives in custody agreements can reflect "coercion, blackmail, con-
sideration of property or other personal reasons not necessarily related to the best 
interest of the child"); Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Vio-
lence, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1501, 1600 (1993) [hereinafter Developments) (noting that 
a mother who protects her child may hurt her chances of obtaining custody); see 
also UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1973) (suggesting 
that the court should not consider "conduct of a proposed custodian that does not 
affect his relationship to the child"). 
28. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.021(h) (West Supp. 1995) (prohibiting 
the award of joint custody "if credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern 
of past or present child neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by one parent directed 
against the other parent, a spouse, or any child"). 
29. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fre-
quent occurrence of child abuse with spousal abuse. 
30. Campbell v. Campbell, 604 A.2d 33, 35 n.2 (Me. 1992) (citing the trial 
court, which stated that a standard strategy in contested custody is to file an ex 
parte order for protection from abuse to gain temporary custody and delay); see 
generally DAVID HOROWITZ, FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, SEXUAL 
ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN DIVORCE CASES 51, 53 (1988). 
31. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3027(a) (West 1994) (providing a monetary 
sanction for a knowing false allegation of child abuse during a custody proceeding). 
32. See, e.g., Sharp v. Sharp, 710 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. App. 1986), where the 
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minimizes the allegations as exaggerations of spousal combat 
or relies solely on the determination of abuse by the juvenile 
authority, which applies a stricter standard of proo£l3 than is 
applicable to custody determinations in family court.34 With-
out a fully developed record, the family court may be forced to 
ignore important signs of abuse.35 Moreover, when allegations 
of abuse are not fully examined or explored, the appellate court 
lacks sufficient justification to question the reasonableness of 
the trial court's decision.36 
In Esdale v. Esdale,37 the family court granted custody to 
a father despite testimony from county child protection work-
ers, a psychologist, and the guardian ad litem that the father 
had abused the child.38 Evidence that no child abuse had oc-
curred included a psychiatrist's opinion that the father was not 
a child abuser and testimony that the mother fabricated the 
charges.39 On appeal, although the court found the evidence 
supporting the father's sexual abuse "most troubling,,,40 the 
court nevertheless held that the record was insufficient to 
lower court approved custody to the mother while refusing to allow the court-ap-
pointed psychologist to interview her live-in companion, who was accused of abus-
ing the child. Id. The appellate court affirmed the decision, but the dissent empha-
sized that the trial court has a duty to inquire into all matters that affect the 
interests of the child even when the parties show a lack of diligence in gathering 
evidence of abuse. Id. 
33. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (requiring clear and 
convincing evidence as the minimal due process standard in proceedings to termi-
nate parental rights). 
34. See Mallory v. Mallory, 539 A.2d 995, 998 (Conn. 1988), where the family 
court allowed only supervised visitation by the father on a fair preponderance of 
the evidence of child abuse instead of the clear and convincing criminal standard 
required to terminate parental rights. 
35. See OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(3) (1990) (requiring the court to ignore a 
parent's "conduct, marital status, income, social environment," or similar factors 
unless they are shown to cause damage to the child). 
36. Changing the lower court's decision requires a finding of abuse of discre-
tion or that the award is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Mar-
riage of Siegel, 463 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ill. App. 1984) (finding the presumption fa-
voring the trial court is "strong and compelling"); Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 
N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (N.Y. 1982) (reversing the appellate court's modification of the 
trial court's custody determination). "Appellate courts should be reluctant to substi-
tute their own evaluation of [the child's best interests)." Id. 
37. 487 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. App. 1986). 
38. Id. at 1220 (Glickstein, J., concurring). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 1219. 
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demonstrate that granting custody to the father was unreason-
able.41 
Even when the lower court restricts custody, the appellate 
court may find an abuse of discretion and place the child in the 
custody of a potentially abusing parent. In Gould v. Gould,42 
an Arkansas appellate court modified a trial court decision 
allowing only supervised visitation by the father who had been 
accused of abusing his daughters.4s The court of appeal dis-
counted the testimony of a pediatrician confirming evidence of 
sexual abuse.44 Finding the evidence insufficient, the appel-
late court modified the trial court's decision by allowing unsu-
pervised visitation with the father during summer vacation so 
that he could "form normal parental bonds with his chil-
dren."45 
Cases such as these illustrate that the child's welfare may 
be preempted where the lower court has not fully explored 
evidence of abuse and no one has spoken for the child. If child 
abuse indeed exists, decisions regarding custody and visitation 
which are based upon inadequate information may subject the 
child to continued physical and psychological harm. 
41. [d. The concurring judge noted that he changed his opinion from a dissent 
due to the ruling in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (prevent-
ing appellate judges from overruling the reasonable opinion of a trial court). 
Esdale, 487 So. 2d at 1220. 
42. No. CA 90-365, 1992 Ark. App. LEXIS 255 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1992) 
(denial of petition for rehearing) (en bane). 
43. Id. at *9 (en bane) (Mayfield, J., concurring) (stating that the trial court's 
decision was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence). See id. at *13-27 
(Cooper, J., dissenting), for a reproduction of the original three judge panel court 
of appeal opinion. 
44. Id. at *8 (Mayfield, J., concurring). However, the trial judge believed that 
the pediatrician's findings, concerning the physical evidence of sexual abuse of the 
three daughters, were "true and correct" and "had not been rebutted." [d. at *7. 
45. Id. at *4 (Mayfield, J., concurring). The dissent from the denial of petition 
for rehearing questioned whether the appellate court could, with certainty, reverse 
the trial court based upon an appellate determination that a key witness was not 
credible. Id. at *28. 
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B. SIMULTANEOUS SPOUSAL ABUSE COMPLICATES MATTERS BY 
FURTHER SUPPRESSING RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
Custody proceedings face added difficulties when allega-
tions of child abuse arise in situations also involving domestic 
violence against a spouse.46 The presence of spousal abuse 
greatly increases the probability that the child is also 
abused.47 Nevertheless, many factors lead to an incomplete 
inquiry into the family situation and the relationship between 
spousal abuse and child abuse. For example, a parent is un-
likely to fully report facts concerning abuse if that parent is 
not only subject to abuse, but also participating in the child 
abuse.48 Furthermore, a battered spouse may choose not to 
report child abuse out of fear of retaliatory beatings by the 
other spouse.49 If the battered spouse does report the abuse or 
leaves, that spouse risks losing the child,50 for he or she will 
46. Domestic violence refers to violence against a spouse. See In re Williams, 
432 N.E.2d 375, 376 (Ill. App. 1982) (observing that domestic violence can be a 
"beacon" of potential harm to the child); In re Wiley, 556 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Ill. 
App. 1990) (holding that even when there was no evidence of child abuse, the trial 
court properly concluded that allegations of spousal abuse could be a decisive fac-
tor in the custody decision); see also Meisner v. Meisner, 490 N.Y.S.2d 536, 537 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985), where the trial court ignored allegations of physical and 
mental abuse toward the mother, the children, and third persons during a hearing 
on visitation. The appellate court deemed evidence of this violence relevant to the 
disposition of the case and remanded the matter for a new hearing. Id. 
47. LEE H. BOWKER, MICHELLE ARBlTELL & J. RICHARD MCFERRON, ON THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WIFE BEATING AND CHILD ABUSE, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 
ON WIFE ABUSE 158, 162 (1988) (finding, in a study involving 1000 battered wom-
en, that child abuse was present in seventy percent of the families where spousal 
abuse occurred); Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis, 
Commentary and Recommendations, Juv & FAM. CT. J. 1992lVol. 43, No.4, 33 
(finding that daughters are six times more likely to be sexually abused when wife 
abuse occurs). 
48. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 60 (1984). 
Walker found that women were eight times more likely to abuse children when 
they themselves were being battered than when they were not in abusive relation-
ships. Id. She also found that 53% of men who abused their mates also abused 
their children, while 28% of the women who were abused did so. Id. at 59. 
49. See M. Kara, Domestic Violence and Custody - "To Ensure Domestic Tran· 
quility," 14 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 623, 634 (1984) (noting that abused spouses 
tend to be fearful and are often exposed to danger when they resort to the 
courts). See generally Linda R. Keenan, Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation: 
The Need for Statutory Reform, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407, 422 (1985). 
50. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 113 (1987) (findi~g that if 
a battered woman leaves before the abuse gets serious, the court may decide that 
she is unstable for abandoning her child); Ilona M. Bessenyey, Visitation in the 
9
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have difficulty explaining how a person could tolerate the 
abuse but still be an effective parent.51 
Although a majority of states require courts to consider 
the existence of domestic violence in determining custody and 
visitation,52 these allegations often are not fully investigated. 
Both social workers and the judicial system tend to dismiss 
charges of spousal abuse which arise during divorce proceed-
ings53 or consider supporting evidence of spousal abuse irrele-
vant to child custody decisions. 54 When social workers and 
Domestic Violence Context: Problems and Recommendations, 14 VT. L. REV. 57, 68 
(1989) (concluding that lack of cooperation regarding visitation in abusive situa-
tions places the woman at risk of losing her child); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal 
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
46-47 (1991) (describing a situation where "a woman who had obtained a restrain-
ing order against her husband land] awoke one night to find him wielding a knife 
in her bedroom; after she fled into the night, he claimed she had abandoned the 
children, and she was unable to regain custody"). 
51. See Developments, supra note 27, at 1601-02 (citing Elizabeth M. Schnei-
der, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in 
Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 556-57 (1992) and noting that a 
mother must demonstrate that she is an effective parent to receive custody, but 
remaining in an abusive situation conveys helplessness); see also Hill v. Hill, No. 
86-0399, slip op. (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 4, 1987), where a judge granted custody to the 
mother, changing the original award to the father, after the mother testified that 
she had initially agreed to give custody to the father because he had beaten her 
and the children. The court ordered the modification because the evidence of abuse 
was not before the judge at the time of the initial custody award. Id. 
52. Developments, supra note 27, at 1603 (finding that most states recently 
have mandated domestic violence as a factor or as a presumption against custody); 
see, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.20.090(8) (1991) (requiring courts to consider "any 
evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect in the proposed custodi-
al household or a history of violence between the parents"). 
53. See FIELDS, Spouse Abuse as a Factor in Custody and Visitation Decisions, 
in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 147, 162 (1986) (noting that "the issue of the 
harmful effect on children from witnessing parental violence has had little impact 
on our legal system"); see also Charlotte Germane, Margaret Johnson & Nancy 
Lemon, Mandatory Custody Mediation and Joint Custody Orders in California: The 
Danger for Victims of Domestic Violence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 175, 192-93 
(1985) (stating that "[j]udges and mediators also may make it clear to a battered 
woman that the batterer's violence towards her is irrelevant in determining custo-
dy and visitation"). 
54. See In re Benjamin D., 278 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 n.5 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing 
a California study which found judges often do not consider spousal abuse relevant 
in custody decisions). The lower court had limited the introduction of evidence of 
spousal abuse in spite of universal agreement of its detriment to children. Id. The 
appellate court, however, observed that CAL. CIY. CODE § 4608, as amended in 
1990, requires consideration of spousal abuse. Id.; see also Naomi R. Cahn, Civil 
Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody 
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courts do investigate the combination of spousal and child 
abuse, they may even decide that the battered spouse is an 
unfit parent for failing to protect the child.55 Legislation in 
most states classifies a parent's failure to protect the child 
from abuse as child neglect and imposes possible criminal 
penalties. 56 
Because the occurrence of spousal abuse with child abuse 
increases the likelihood that evidence of child abuse will not be 
fully explored by either the government or the parents, the 
child has a strong interest in independent representation. 
Providing the child with independent representation encourag-
es the development of a true picture of the family situation and 
assists in confirming or denying all of the allegations. 
C. OTHER INTERESTS OFTEN OVERSHADOW THE CHILD'S 
INTERESTS 
1. State Interests 
State statutes, under the doctrine of parens patriae, reflect 
the policy of preserving the natural family.57 Thus, joint cus-
Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1045 (1991) (concluding that the law punishes 
battered women in custody decisions because the mother is required to prove that 
domestic violence directly impacts the child in order to be relevant as evidence). 
55. See In re Betty J.W., 371 S.E.2d 326, 328 (W. Va. 1988), where the trial 
court terminated the mother's parental rights because she failed to protect children 
from her husband's abuse. The appellate court reversed termination of the 
mother's parental rights, finding that the mother had tried to stop the abuse and 
that she should be given time to overcome the effects of battered woman's syn-
drome on her parenting. Id. at 332-33.; see also WALKER, supra note 48 (observing 
that, although mothers often cannot control the violence against themselves or 
their families, child abuse workers frequently blame mothers for failing to protect 
the child). 
56. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Femi-
nist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U.L. REV. 520, 553 
(1992). Schneider points out that thirty-five states include the concept of omission 
of protection in their statutory definition of "child abuse" and eight states 
criminalize the failure to protect. Id. 
57. State public policy often emphasizes "frequent and continuing contact with 
both parents" after divorce. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West 1994); In 
Interest of Betty J. W., 371 S.E.2d 326, 329 (W. Va. 1988) (stating that child wel-
fare statutes reflect this parens patriae bias towards maintaining family bonds); 
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 835, 854 (1985) (concluding that "a great deal of behavior that would be 
criminal or tortious between strangers may still be done with impunity within a 
11
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tody statutes usually presume that the best interests of the 
child require maintaining contact with both parents.5S This 
presumption may even disfavor granting custody to a parent 
who believes abuse has occurred and opposes shared custo-
dy.59 Visitation policies also presume that the child benefits 
from contact with the non-custodial parent.60 Furthermore, 
the government may express a policy interest of minimal inter-
ference with family relations and thereby exercise deference to 
the family at the expense of preventing abuse.61 These state 
policies foster continued contact with each parent even where 
one parent may be abusing the child.62 
An additional state interest that may overshadow the 
family"). 
58. Joanne Schulman & Valerie Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: 
Analysis of Legislation and Its Implications for Women and Children, 12 GoLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 538, 554 (1982) (arguing that these "friendly parent" provisions 
in joint custody statutes discourage opposition to joint custody); see FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that "parental responsibility for 
a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared paren-
tal responsibility would be detrimental to the child"). But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 
3040(b) (West 1994) (establishing no preference for or against joint or sole custo-
dy); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1994) (creating a presumption, affecting the 
burden of proof, that joint custody is in the child's best interests only if the par-
ents agree to joint custody). 
59. See In re Marriage of Bolin, 336 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Iowa 1983) (observing 
that "[w]hen one parent's obduracy makes joint custody unworkable, the trial court 
in a modification proceeding may find the child's best interests require sole cus-
tody in the other parent"); ALAsKA STAT. § 25.20.090(6)(E) (1991) (requiring consid-
eration of which parent will encourage frequent contact with the other parent). 
60. A parent is entitled to visitation unless the court finds that "visitation 
would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health." 
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 407. For example, in Beckham v. O'Brien, 
the appellate court found an abuse of discretion where the trial court allowed 
visitation rights while criminal charges of abuse against the father were pending. 
336 S.E.2d 375, 377 (Ga. App. 1985). The court also found that the mother was 
justified in refusing to obey the visitation order. Id. at 378. 
61. See Laura Oren, The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive 
Due Process: Deshaney in Context, 68 N.C.L. REv. 659, 713-14 (1990) (explaining 
that increased state and federal interest in domestic violence during the late 1970s 
led to a conservative backlash to protect the family from government intervention). 
The Family Protection Act, seeking to eliminate federal funds for child abuse pre-
vention, was introduced, and in 1981, President Reagan closed the Office of Do-
mestic Violence. Id. 
62. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332(A)(6) (Supp. 1994) (stating that a 
relevant factor in the custody determination includes "[w]hich parent is more likely 
to allow the child frequent and meaningful continuing contact with the other par-
ent"). 
12
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child's interest is the conservation of fiscal resources.63 Under 
discretionary appointment, the family court must consider that 
the state bears the cost if both parents cannot pay for the 
child's appointed counsel.64 When neither parent can pay, the 
parents' own representation may be inadequate to fully exam-
ine allegations of abuse.65 Thus, the state's interest in 
conserving fiscal resources may lead a court to deny ap-
pointment of representation in precisely the situations where it 
is most needed. 
The state also has an interest in maintaining the integrity 
and reputation of its social service agencies as an adequate 
protector of the child. When child abuse allegations are inves-
tigated, the social worker often acts as the guardian ad litem 
for the child and is presumed to represent the child's inter-
ests.66 The social worker prepares a family social study and is 
deemed a "disinterested party" whose reports are reliable.67 
However, state legislation requiring prompt reporting and 
investigation of child abuse, scarce resources, and the atten-
dant problems of proof all combine to discourage the full civil 
and criminal investigation of abuse cases.58 If the social work-
63. See State ex rei. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County v. Wade, 527 P.2d 
753, 757 (Or. App. 1974) (finding that the state may overlook the child's interest 
to avoid expensive foster care). 
64. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3153 (West 1994) (allowing the court to appor· 
tion any costs of the child's counsel that parents are unable to pay to the county). 
65. Judge Leonard P. Edwards, The Relationship of Family and Juvenile 
Courts in Child Abuse Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 201, 217 & n.103 (1987). 
Judge Edwards observes that one or both parents may be without an attorney, 
because government legal services is often unable to represent indigents in custody 
proceedings except under extraordinary circumstances. Id. The lack of counsel for 
the parents will limit examination of crucial issues relating to abuse. Id. at 217. 
66. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 326 (West Supp. 1995). The guardian 
ad litem cannot be the attorney responsible for presenting evidence of abuse. Id. 
67. See In re Malinda S., 795 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Cal. 1990) (finding a social 
worker's "objectivity and expertise" suggest that the findings are reliable, because 
they prepare such reports "in the regular course of their professional duties"). 
68. See Susan B. Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal 
System: Beyond Contempt, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 500·01 (1989), where the author 
notes that juvenile authorities investigating abuse may lack adequate time and 
funding to fully investigate allegations. Apel cites MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5· 
706 (1984) (requiring a completed investigation within 10 days) and IND. CODE 
ANN. § 31·6·11-5 (Burns 1987) (requiring a written report within 48 hours). Id. at 
500-01 n.38. Proof frequently involves the child as the only witness to abuse and 
no resources are available for expert testimony. Id. at 501. These inherent prob-
lems, along with high caseloads caused by reporting requirements, persuade many 
13
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er does not confirm allegations of abuse, the court is unlikely 
to substitute its judgment for that of the social worker and 
may thus limit further investigation.69 Because social workers 
must respond on an expedited basis with inadequate resources, 
the reliance on their investigation is often misplaced. 
2. Parental Interests 
Many cases of child abuse are not adequately investigated 
due to concern for the rights of parents. Parents traditionally 
have several important interests, including keeping their fami-
ly affairs private,70 maintaining family integrity,71 and mini-
mizing the acrimony of the divorce process.72 Thus, in custody 
cases, parents are generally assumed to be fit, and they have 
"comprehensive" legal rights.73 
Courts are generally willing to allow a temporary restric-
prosecutors not to prosecute child abuse cases. Id. 
69. See Myra Sun & Elizabeth Thomas, Custody Litigation on Behalf of Bat· 
tered Women, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 562, 573 (1987) (stating that according to 
one estimate, judges follow the recommendations of social workers approximately 
90% of the time); see also In re Danielle W., 255 Cal. Rptr. 344, 350 (Ct. App. 
1989) (finding that courts can grant limited discretion to Children Services to 
determine visitation). 
70. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1981) (finding general accep-
tance of the idea that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a 
fundamental liberty interest). But see Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Mar· 
ket: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 lIARv. L. REV. 1497, 1510 (1983) 
(stating that "the assertion that family affairs should be private has been made by 
men to prevent women and children from using state power to improve the condi-
tions of their lives"). 
71. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that both 
parents and children possess reciprocal rights to preserve family integrity). Parents 
have an interest in the "companionship, care, custody and management of . . . 
children .... " Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972». "[T)he chil-
dren [have an interest) in not being dislocated from the emotional attachments 
that derive from the intimacy of daily association." Id. (citing Smith v. Organiza-
tion of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977». 
72. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Morrison, 573 P.2d 41, 49 (Cal. 1978) (finding 
that the California Legislature created no fault divorce in order to reduce the 
acrimony which divorce proceedings engender). 
73. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: 
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has 
Failed, 70 VAND. L. REV. 879, 884-85 (1984) (finding parental rights include custo-
dy of the child, discipline of the child, and decisions about education, medical 
treatment, and religious upbringing of the child). Parents may speak for the child 
and may assert or waive the child's rights. Id. at 884. 
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tion of parental rights where there is evidence that the child's 
safety may be threatened. For example, in emergency situa-
tions, most courts will grant temporary custody to one parent 
or restrict visitation through a civil protection order.74 In a 
final custody determination, however, restriction of parental 
custody to protect the child from harm may require a "fair 
preponderance of the evidence. "75 Although the court has 
broad power to protect the child's interests,76 lack of evidence 
of abuse may prevent the court from restricting custody.77 
Thus, this concern for the rights of parents effectively 
diminishes concern for the best interests of the child. 
IV. THE MODERN TREND IN STATE COURTS AND 
LEGISLATURES: MANDATORY APPOINTMENT 
Because appointment of counsel for the child is discretion-
ary in most states, failure to appoint is rarely reviewed by ap-
pellate courtS.78 However, some state appellate courts have 
found an abuse of discretion in failing to appoint where there 
were allegations of child abuse.79 In G.S. v. T.S.,80 a Connect-
74. Most states allow a parent to obtain temporary custody of her children 
through a civil protection order obtained ex parte. Peter Finn, Statutory Authority 
in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 
FAM. L.Q. 43, 51 (1989). Ex parte orders for emergency situations are typically 
valid for ten to fourteen days. Id.; Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 995-96 
(Okla. App. 1984) (allowing a temporary restriction on visitation). Before issuing 
such an order, California courts must consider whether the best interests of the 
child require suspended or denied visitation. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3100(b)' (West 
Supp. 1995). 
75. See, e.g., Mallory v. Mallory, 539 A.2d 995, 998 (Conn. 1988) (requiring a 
fair preponderance of the evidence to restrict custody). 
76. See In re Macomber, 461 N.W.2d 671, 672 (Mich. 1990) (finding that the 
legislature has given the court broad authority to define harmful conduct and 
fashion remedies as "necessary for the physical, mental, or moral well-being of a 
particular child"); In re Albert B., 263 Cal. Rptr. 694, 702 (Ct. App. 1989) (bal-
ancing the rights of parents and children in a dependency proceeding for neglect). 
The court found that children have a right to custody that does not constantly 
endanger them. Id. 
77. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. 
78. See Elrod, supra note 22, at 56. 
79. See M.M. v. R.R.M., 358 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. App. 1984), where the 
appellate court held that the trial court erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad 
litem where the parents strongly disputed custody and the stepfather abused the 
children. Lack of independent representation resulted in minimal testimony by the 
children and an incomplete record. Id.; Leonard v. Leonard, 783 S.W.2d 514, 516 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding the trial court erred in failing to appoint a guardian 
15
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icut trial court failed to appoint counsel for the minor children 
despite a motion for appointment by one parent and knowledge 
that child abuse would be a major issue in the custody proceed-
ing.sl Finding that evidence was not conclusive concerning the 
custodial parent's knowledge of abuse by a cousin, the trial 
court maintained custody with that parent.S2 The appellate 
court remanded, however, noting that the presence of counsel 
for the children would likely have led to several changes in the 
trial proceedings.83 The appellate court concluded that, in con-
tested custody proceedings containing allegations of child 
abuse, neither the parents nor the court can be relied upon to 
advocate the children's best interests.84 Therefore, the chil-
dren both "[need] and [are] entitled to counsel to advocate their 
best interests. 1185 
Similarly, in C.J.(SJ.R. v. a.D.S.,ss a Missouri trial court 
found that "the child abuse was not a sufficient change in 
conditions to merit a change in [the children's] custody."s7 The 
appellate court reversed, stating that the child's interests typi-
cally are not represented in custody cases involving child abuse 
because "the evidence gatherers are the lawyers for the com-
peting parents, whose primary purpose is to put their client's 
best foot forward."ss The court held it was an abuse of discre-
ad litem where the court had knowledge of alleged abuse by a parent claiming a 
right to custody). 
80. 582 A.2d 467, 470 (Conn. App. 1990) (finding that in contested custody 
cases where there are allegations of abuse, "children have a unique need to be 
represented by counsel who will advocate their best interests"). 
81. [d. at 468. Before the trial started, the court changed temporary custody 
based upon allegations that the custodial parent's cousin. had sexually molested 
one of the children. [d. On the first day of trial, the cousin admitted the molesta-
tion. [d. at 469. The custodial parent denied knowledge of the abuse despite con-
flicting testimony. [d. at 468. 
82. [d. at 469. 
83. [d. at 470-71. The court of appeal noted that counsel for the child could 
have requested a family relations study and involved the court in assessing the 
allegations at the earliest possible date. [d. at 470. Counsel could have pointed out 
that the child was competent to testify and argued that the child's testimony was 
pivotal. [d. Counsel could also have contested the parent's waiver of the child's 
confidentiality with her sexual abuse counselor. [d. at 471. 
84. [d. at 471. 
85. o.S., 582 A.2d at 471. 
86. 701 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. App. 1985). 
87. [d. at 168-69. 
88. 1d. at 169. 
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tion not to appoint a guardian ad litem where the trial court in 
a custody dispute knows of past or current child abuse.89 Ac-
knowledging the court's holding, in 1988 the Missouri Legisla-
ture passed a statute mandating appointment of a representa-
tive for the child where there are allegations of child abuse or 
neglect.90 
Other courts, however, have not been so willing to find an 
abuse of discretion in the failure to appoint a representative 
for the child.9! In Sucher v. Sucher,92 the Minnesota Court of 
Appeal refused to find an abuse of discretion in the trial court's 
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem though each parent had 
alleged abuse' and had requested appointment.93 The trial 
court found that the mother's friends had either sexually 
"abused the children or behaved in a less than exemplary man-
ner . ..w. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the evidence 
was insufficient to confirm that the mother had allowed sexual 
abuse of the children or that the father had physically abused 
the mother or coached the children to allege abuse.95 
The dissent in Sucher argued that the children's safety 
required an independent representative for the children's inter-
ests.96 Following that logic, the Minnesota Legislature amend-
89. [d. The court urged the legislature to codify the decision. [d. 
90. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.423.1 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (providing that "[tlhe 
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem in any proceeding in which child abuse or 
neglect is alleged"); see also Leonard v. Leonard, 783 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Mo. App. 
1990) (finding that C.J.(S).R u. G.D.S. took away judicial discretion in appointment 
"where custody is an issue and the court has knowledge of alleged abuse by one 
claiming a right to custody"). 
91. See Schenk v. Schenk, 564 N.E.2d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding 
no abuse of discretion in not appointing a guardian ad litem in modification pro-
ceeding where the trial court removed. custody from the mother who was currently 
involved with the past abuser of the children). In Schenk, although the trial court 
did not appoint counsel, it did, however, remove the children from a potentially 
abusive situation. [d. at 975. 
92. 416 N.W.2d 182 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
93. [d. at 186. 
94. [d. at 184. 
95. See id. at 183-84. The prevalence of child abuse when there is spousal 
abuse is discussed supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
96. [d. at 186 (Lansing, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the threat to 
the children's safety required "vigorous independent representation of the children 
by counsel acting in their interest and their interest only." [d. (quoting M.M. v. 
R.R.M., 358 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), where the appellate court con-
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ed the pertinent state statute to require appointment when the 
court has reason to believe that a child may be a victim of 
abuse.97 
When the trial court knows of allegations of abuse and yet 
refuses to appoint an independent representative for the child, 
the court denies the child a voice in a proceeding that endan-
gers the child's well-being.98 Although four states recognize 
this danger and have concluded that the child requires inde-
pendent representation when there are allegations of child 
abuse,99 every state should acknowledge this need for counsel 
as a due process right. 100 
V. DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES REQUIRE MANDATORY 
APPOINTMENT 
Due process guarantees are implicated when government 
procedures threaten a life, liberty, or property interest protect-
ed by the Fourteenth Amendment.101 These "liberty interests" 
are not limited to protection from government confinement, but 
also include involvement in government proceedings which 
demned the trial record a8 "woefully incomplete" because there was a past history 
of abuse, yet the trial court had not ordered a home study because the parents 
believed it unnecessary). 
97. See 1986 Minn. Laws ch. 469, § 1. The statute requires the appointment of 
a guardian ad litem in any child custody proceeding in which "the court has rea· 
son to believe that the minor child is a victim of domestic child abuse or neglect." 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.165(2) (West 1990). 
98. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (finding that the child's "well· 
being" cannot be left. to discretion of estranged parents); see also Short v. Short, 
730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990) (stating that children may be pawns 
between parents and, therefore, require independent representation); Higgins v. 
Higgins, 629 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tenn. App. 1981) (stating that in cases of intense 
hostility, the rights of children are not properly represented without independent 
counsel); Clark v. Clark, 358 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 1984) (remanding for 
appointment to assure that "one voice" represents the child); GoLDSTEIN, ET AL. 
supra note 24. Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection Pro· 
ceedings: The Determination of Decision·Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287, 293 
(1983) (concluding that parents cannot be expected to represent the child's best 
interests when their interests conflict with those of the child). 
99. Connecticut requires appointment by judicial precedent. Missouri, Minneso· 
ta, and Florida require appointment by statute. Wisconsin requires appointment in 
all contested cases. See supra notes 18-19 discussing the state statutes. 
100. See infra notes 101-50 and accompanying text. 
101. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("Nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "). 
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affect safety and well-being. 102 Furthermore, the United 
States Constitution generally affords children rights coexten-
sive with those of adults when the government seeks to de-
prive children of these interests. 103 
The circumstances implicating due process depend upon 
the nature of the government function and the private interest 
affected by the government action. 104 In extending due pro-
cess rights to civil divorce proceedings, the United States Su-
preme Court stressed the exclusiveness of the judicial remedy 
and the fundamental nature of the subject matter.105 Addi-
tionally, judges generally recognize parental loss of custody as 
"punishment more severe than many criminal sanctions."106 
The policy behind extension of due process rights to civil 
divorce proceedings is equally persuasive when viewed from 
102. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). Liberty has a 
broad meaning extending to rights "essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness .... " Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923»; Ingraham 
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (finding school children have a liberty interest 
in personal security). 
103. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-35 (1979). 
104. See In the matter of K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 278 (Alaska 1991) (holding an 
indigent father has a due process right to counsel in termination proceedings). The 
court noted that parental rights are of the highest significance when faced with 
the finality of termination. Id. at 283. But see Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers 
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (noting that notice and hearing are 
not constitutionally required when the private interest is a privilege granted by 
the government). 
105. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971). The Court held that due 
process prohibits denying an indigent access to divorce courts because the require-
ment of a judicial decree for divorce is "entirely a state-created matter." Id. The 
Court stated that the right of access to divorce courts is "the exclusive precondi-
tion to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship." Id.; see Flores v. 
Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 895 (Alaska 1979), where the court found that there is a 
strong state interest in divorce-child custody proceedings. Unlike commercial con-
tracts, legally binding marriages and divorces are wholly creations of the state." 
Id. 
106. Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appointed Counsel in froceeding 
for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 80 A.L.R. 3d 1141, 1145; cf May 
v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (noting that custody is far more important 
than property rights); see also Order-Probable Jurisdiction Noted or Postponed, 
402 U.S. 954, 954-61 (1971), where Justices Black and Douglas comment that the 
due process found in Boddie should apply to all civil disputes. Justice Black noted 
that when due process guarantees "meaningful access to civil courts in divorce 
cases, ... Boddie necessitates the appointment of counsel for indigents." Id. at 
959. 
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the child's perspective.107 Although children are legally con-
sidered "persons, »108 courts limit their constitutional rights 
because of their immaturity and in deference to the role of par-
ents in overseeing children.109 Normally, parents assume con-
trol of the child. However, when parental control fails, the 
government adopts the role of parens patriae. l1O When both 
the parents and the government fail to protect a minor's rights, 
due process must provide the child with constitutional guaran-
tees.l11 Divorce custody decisions are exemplary of a situation 
where the child's rights may lack protection because both the 
government and the parents have other interests that over-
shadow the interests of the child. 112 
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S BALANCING TEST 
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a balancing 
test to determine what process is due.113 The Court looks at 
three distinct factors: the private interest affected by the offi-
107. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940) (holding a lack of due pro-
cess exists where procedures do not protect the interests of those bound but not 
present). In states with discretionary appointment a child is usually not present or 
independently represented. See supra notes 3 & 9 and accompanying text. 
108. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (stating that "con-
stitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one 
attains the state-defined age of mlYority"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 13 (1967) (stat-
ing that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults 
alone"). 
109. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (invalidating a Massachu-
setts law requiring parental consent for abortions by unmarried minors). The 
Court summarized the rationale for treating children differently than adults, 
stressing "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical 
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role 
in child-rearing." Id. 
110. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (allowing pretrial preventive 
detention for juvenile suspects). Parens patriae originally referred to the state's 
protection of the property and person of the child. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16. 
111. Cf, In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-28 (establishing a minor's constitutional 
right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings which may result in commit-
ment to an institution); see Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in CUB-
tody Decisions: All that Glitters is not Gault, 15 J. FAM. L. 27, 27 (1976-77) (find-
ing that Gault changed "the balance of power in child-populated, adult-dominated 
institutions"). 
112. Bersoff, supra note Ill, at 30-33. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying 
text for the author's discussion regarding how the states' and parents' interests 
often overshadow the interests of the child. 
113. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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cial action, the risk of error in the state's chosen procedure and 
the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the 
state's interest in maintaining the current procedure.114 
1. The Child's Interests 
The child has a strong interest in growing up free from 
abuse.116 "[C]hlldren who are abused in their youth generally 
face extraordinary problems developing into responsible, pro-
ductive citizens."I1S An abused child has an increased likeli-
hood of later winding up in juvenile court and, finally, in adult 
criminal proceedings. ll7 Thus, by appointing counsel to en-
sure representation of the child's best interests, the court can 
fully explore the possibility that the child is being abused. 
Moreover, by removing the child from an abusive situation, the 
court promotes the child's growth into a responsible adult. 
2. The Risk of Error in Current Procedures and the Probable 
Value of Additional Safeguards 
Contested custody determinations are by their nature 
exceedingly difficult decisions for a court, requiring a predic-
tion of the future welfare of the child based upon limited infor-
mation.118 When allegations of child abuse exist, the complex-
ity of these proceedings is enhanced,119 thereby increasing the 
danger that a court might ratify an ongoing relationship with a 
potentially abusive parent. 120 Evidence in custody proceed-
114. See icl. The state's interests include the government function involved and 
"fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirements would entail." [d. 
115. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (observing that the 
entire society benefits when the child is "safeguarded from abuses and given op-
portunities for growth"). 
116. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.s. 745, 789 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
117. Podell, supra note 8, at 106 (observing that the public will pay more in 
future costs if the child's welfare is not properly considered at the divorce custody 
proceeding). 
118. See supra note 4. 
119. Nancy Thoennes, Child Sexual Abuse: Whom Should a Judge Believe? What 
Should a Judge Believe?, THE JUDGES' JOURNAL, Summer 1988, Vol. 27, No.3, 14, 
·17 (1988) (observing that contested custody proceedings with allegations of abuse 
are the most complex and time-consuming proceedings in family court). 
120. See GoLDSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 24, at 66. The authors state that "the 
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ings is often entered in the form of opinion not subject to cross-
examination.121 Moreover, the frequent lack of outside wit-
nesses or any physical evidence can make the child's statement 
concerning abuse the key factor supporting allegations. 122 
However, one parent typically challenges the veracity or rele-
vance of the child's statement.123 Furthermore, there may be 
repetitive and improper physical or psychological examination 
of the child which can violate the child's best interests and 
produce questionable results as well. 124 Finally, the court 
presumption [of parental representation of the child) should not prevail . . . once 
the child's placement becomes the subject of a dispute" in the courts and that the 
state's "policies or practices" may also be adverse to the child. Id. In these cases, 
the child should be accorded party status and given independent representation. 
Id.; see also Inker & Perretta, supra note 8, at 111 (suggesting that independent 
evidence, rather than partisan parental advocacy, would better determine the 
child's best interests); Podell, supra note 8, at 103 (arguing that the child of di-
vorce is often a "disenfranchised victim used as a pawn in a game of chess being 
played between its warring parents who frequently want the court to physically 
cut up and divide the child between them in the same manner that they have 
[done) emotionally"); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967), where, in the criminal 
area, the court found that the state's paternalistic dogma of state protection under 
the doctrine of parens patriae can be an "invitation to procedural arbitrariness" 
that violates due process for the child and requires independent representation. 
When the court reaches results of "tremendous consequence, [it) must measure up 
to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." Id. 
121. See Leary v. Leary, 627 A.2d 30, 41 (Md. App. 1993), where the court 
noted that "child custody reports often contain double- or triple-level hearsay, as 
well as opinions of various social workers, medical or paramedical personnel, psy-
chologists, teachers and the like, which mayor may not have a reasonable basis." 
Id. "Generally, these reports are not under oath and often emanate from people 
having an overt or covert bias." Id. 
122. See State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (Kan. 1985), where the court ob-
served that witnesses other than the child are rare, as molestation is usually done 
in private. Since the physical evidence may be inconclusive, proof of abuse depends 
upon the child's statements. Id. . 
123. Apel, supra note 68, at 496 (explaining that children are often accused of 
fabricating abuse); HOROWITZ, supra note 30, at 60 (concluding that the pressures 
on the child can lead to either false denial or false affirmation of the allegations); 
Marian D. Hall, The Role of Psychologists as Experts in Cases Involving Allega-
tions of Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 451, 463 (1989) (concluding that psy-
chologists lack a profile to separate abuse from other traumatic experiences such 
as divorce); see generally John R. Christiansen, The Testimony pn Child Witnesses: 
Fact, Fantasy, and the Influence of Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REV. 705 
(1987) (summarizing problems associated with determining the child's competency 
and credibility). 
124. See Gotwald v. Gotwald, 768 S.W.2d 689, 701 (Tenn. App. 1988) (Franks, 
J., concurring) (recommending that the court protect the child from repetitive eval-
uations and physical examinations by "hired guns"); Roland C. Summit, The Child 
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 177 (1983), 
where the authors find that repeated questioning of an abused child about a trau-
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may apply current fads in social research pertaining to custo-
dy125 or .overly rely upon reports from social welfare agencies 
which may minimize the consideration of abuse. 126 Because 
the risk of an erroneous custody determination increases when 
allegations of abuse exist, the probable value of additional 
procedural safeguards is magnified. 
Numerous courts have acknowledged a need for indepen-
dent counsel for the child in sharply contested custody disputes 
to ensure that the presentation of evidence remains clearly 
focused on the best interests of the child.127 Appointment of 
counsel helps guarantee that the possibility of child abuse will 
be fully explored.128 Additionally, appointment of counsel can 
guarantee the child a continuing relationship if there are mul-
tiple proceedings or if new facts concerning abuse come to 
light.129 Thus, if states were required to appoint counsel for 
matic event will double the trauma. Unless the child is strongly supported, the 
child normally retracts her complaint of abuse. Id. at 188. 
125. See Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in 
Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, WIS. L. REV. 107, 118-19 
(1987). The authors analyze the use and misuse of social science research in custo· 
dy decisions and argue that current emphasis on "father custody" literature has 
seriously eroded the mother's position in custody decisions to the detriment of the 
child's best interests. Id. But see David Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assess· 
ing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 
1005 (1989) (defending the usefulness of social science data which is free from the 
bias of the individual researcher). 
126. See Apel, supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
inherent problems of investigating allegations of child abuse. 
127. See, e.g., Yontef v. Yontef, 440 A.2d 899, 904 (Conn. 1981) (stating that 
the court should appoint independent counsel in seriously contested cases); see also 
Gennarini v. Gennarini, 477 A.2d 674, 675 n.3 (Conn. App. 1984) (stating that the 
trial court should appoint an attorney for the child in a bitterly contested visita· 
tion dispute); In re Marriage of Kramer, 580 P.2d 439, 444-45 (Mont. 1978) (find· 
ing that the trial court erred in failing to allow counsel for the children to partici· 
pate in all hearings); de Montigny v. de Montigny, 233 N.W.2d 463, 467 (Wis. 
1975) (finding an abuse of discretion in failure to appoint counsel). 
128. Linda L. Long, When the Client is a Child: Dilemmas in the Lawyer's Role, 
21 J. FAM. L. 607, 629 (1982-83) (finding that as the proceeding becomes more 
complex, the child has greater need for an independent advocate to protect her 
interests and to bring out all relevant facts); see Martin Guggenheim, The Right to 
be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 121-22 (arguing that because the best interests test makes 
virtually all aspects of a parent's life relevant, a child advocate may probe into 
"deeply held secrets" which parents have privately agreed to keep out of the 
court's view); supra notes 20-77 and accompanying text emphasizing that concern 
for parental rights often conceals child abuse. 
129. Esdale v. Esdale, 487 So. 2d 1219, 1219 (Fla. App. 1986) (stating that 
23
Peterson: Minors' Right to Counsel
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
536 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:513 
the child in all custody disputes involving allegations of abuse, 
the child's attorney could act as an independent advocate to 
ensure a full investigation, to protect the child's rights, and to 
develop a full record for judicial review. 
3. The Government's Interest in Maintaining Procedural 
Status Quo 
In evaluating whether due process principles require man-
datory appointment of counsel, the child's interests and the 
gravity of an erroneous determination must be balanced 
against the interest of the state in maintaining its current 
procedure. 130 In divorce custody proceedings, although the 
state shares some of the child's interests, other state interests 
are divergent. 
The state's foremost interest is to ensure the best interests 
of the child.13l Because the custody proceeding defines the 
limits of the child's relationship with a parent, the state must 
assume certain affirmative duties to protect that child's inter-
ests.132 Nevertheless, other state interests conflict with the 
interests of the child and thereby favor the state's maintenance 
of the current discretionary appointment procedure. These 
state interests include minimal interference in family rela-
tions,133 supporting confidence in social services' determina-
appointment of guardian ad litem for six months where abuse was not confirmed 
allows the child's interests to be monitored}. 
130. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Su-
preme Court's balancing test. 
131. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (observing that "probably every 
State in the Union ... requires the court to put the child's interest first"); supra 
note 2 for substantiation of the difficulty of determining that interest; cf. Lassiter 
v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1980) (finding a shared interest 
between the state and the parept in a just and accurate decision in a termination 
proceeding). 
132. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
200 (1989) (observing that "[t)he affirmative duty to protect arises not from the 
State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent 
to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act 
on his own behalF). 
133. See supra note 61. But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944), where the court notes that the state may interfere in family affairs to 
safeguard the child's health, educational development and emotional well-being. Id. 
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tion of abuse,134 and saving the· cost of appointment where 
the parents are indigent.135 
Because the "best interests of the child" is the command-
ing purpose of custody proceedings/3s and because these in-
terests are not advanced when courts have discretion whether 
to appoint independent counsel for the child,137 other state 
interests that conflict with the interests of the child should be 
accorded less importance. When the state's interest in assur-
ing that children are adequately represented is compared with 
conflicting state interests that favor maintenance of discretion-
ary appointment, these latter interests appear insignificant. 
B. THE BALANCING TEST FAVORS MANDATORY APPOINTMENT 
Although courts are hesitant to presume a due process 
right to state appointed counsel in a particular class of cases, 
when the party's "interests [are] at their strongest, the States' 
interests [are] at their weakest, and the risks of error [are] at 
their peak," the presumption against the appointment of coun-
sel can be overcome.138 In child custody proceedings involving 
allegations of abuse, the child's interest in representation is 
strong,139 the risk of error without an independent represen-
tative for the child is substantial,140 and the countervailing 
state interest in maintaining discretionary appointment is 
negligible. 141 Because current procedures do not promote the 
commanding purpose of custody determinations, the best inter-
ests of the child, the state's interest in avoiding appointment is 
not sufficient to outweigh the child's interest in adequate rep-
resentation. 142 
134. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text. 
136. See supra notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra notes 23-77 and accompanying text. 
138. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981). 
139. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. 
140. See supra notes 23-77 and 119·30 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text. 
142. Cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (finding 
that the state's pecuniary interest is not sufficient to overcome a parent's interest 
in appointed counsel in a termination proceeding). In its brief the State admitted 
that the potential costs of appointed counsel in termination proceedings are admit-
tedly de minimis compared to the costs in all criminal actions. See id. 
25
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In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,143 the Su-
preme Court found that the United States Constitution allows 
a case-by-case determination of the parental right to appointed 
counsel in termination proceedings rather than guaranteeing 
that right in every case.144 The Court admitted that informed 
public opinion recommends, and most state statutes provide, 
appointed counsel in termination proceedings. 145 The Court 
noted, however, that the decision whether to require mandato-
ry appointment is left to the states. 146 
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, argued that a bright-line 
rule guaranteeing appointment is necessary to provide due 
process to parents. 147 He stressed that a bright-line approach 
provides "procedural norms" in error-prone areas148 and sim-
plifies appellate review. 149 
Lassiter involved proceedings where the parent was pres-
ent and had a right to be represented by retained counsel. In 
divorce custody proceedings where there are allegations of 
child abuse, the fact that the child lacks both party status and 
a right to retained counsel greatly increases the likelihood that 
143. 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (leaving the determination to the trial court with appel-
late review). But see In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 286 (Alaska 1991) (holding that 
termination proceedings require court appointed counsel for the indigent parent). 
The court in K.L.J. cited Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appointed Coun-
sel in Proceeding for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 80 A.L.R. 3d 
1141, 1144-45 as support for the proposition that courts generally find that loss of 
child custody or permanent termination requires procedural due process. Id. at 
285. 
144. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32. 
145. Id. at 33-34. The Court stated that "Iilnformed opinion has clearly come to 
hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not 
only in parental termination proceedings, but in dependency and neglect proceed-
ings as well." The Court noted that 33 states and the District of Columbia provide 
for the appointment of counsel in termination cases by statute. Id. at 34. 
146. See id. 
147. See id. at 35-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
148. Id. at 50 (arguing that when the generality of cases is subject to error, 
procedural norms should be devised to provide justice); see also In re Gault, 387 
U.S. at 18 (noting that "unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is 
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure"). 
149. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50-51. Justice Blackmun stated that a case-by-case 
approach does not lend itself practically to judicial review, because the transcript 
will not be dispositive of whether an unrepresented indigent was disadvantaged. 
[d. Consequently, the reviewing court must expand its analysis into a "cumber-
some and costly," time-consuming investigation of the entire proceeding. Id. at 51. 
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the child's interests will not be adequately protected because 
the child must depend upon the other parties to represent his 
or her interests. 15o Under these conditions, an even stronger 
basis supports Justice Blackmun's assertion that discretionary 
appointment violates due process principles and that a bright-
line rule for appointment is critical. 151 
VI. COMPARING CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS TO 
DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS 
Dependency and termination proceedings parallel "a child 
custody controversy between parents, except that the contro-
versy is not between parents but one, between a parent ... 
and the state as parens patriae."152 State laws generally re-
quire that a guardian ad litem or counsel be appointed for the 
child in state proceedings resulting from a report of abuse or 
neglect. 153 About half the states statutorily require that an 
attorney represent the child.154 Moreover, while the represen-
tation of allegedly abused children in these state-initiated pro-
ceedings is governed by state statutes, it is frequently argued· 
that due process principles impose a duty upon the states to 
150. See supra notes 3 & 9. 
151. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding that the 
complexity of the proceedings and the inability of the parent to present her own 
case could require due process appointment). 
152. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1982). In Santosky, the Court 
noted that a dependency proceeding permits the state to remove a child temporari-
ly from his home to the care of an authorized agency if the child appears "neglect-
ed." Id. at 748. The state has an obligation to attempt to reunite the family. Id. 
However, if the child app~ars "permanently neglected," the state can permanently 
terminate all parental rights based upon a presentation of clear and convincing 
evidence to this effect in a termination proceeding. Id. at 748-49; see also In re 
Robinson, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678, 680 (Ct. App. 1970). 
153. In order for states to receive funding under the Federal Child Abuse Pre-
vention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5101, they must provide by stat-
ute that "in every case involving an abused or neglected child which results in a 
judicial proceeding, a guardian ad litem shall be appointed to represent the child 
in such proceedings." 45 C.F.R. § 1340.3-3(d)(7) (1985). The American Bar Associa-
tion adopted a policy in 1989 stating that, in child abuse and neglect-related judi-
cial proceeding, all children should be represented by both a lay guardian ad litem 
and an attorney acting as the child's legal counsel. Davidson, supra note 8, at 
262. 
154. Davidson, supra note 8, at 268-69. Other states provide a lay or govern-
ment representative for the child, instead of an attorney, and thereby qualify for 
federal funding under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 5101-07 (1988). See id. 
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provide representation.155 
Just as in divorce custody cases, dependency and termina-
tion proceedings involve potential conflicts between the parent 
and the child as well as the state and the child.156 Contrary 
to divorce custody proceedings, however, in termination and 
dependency proceedings the importance of independent repre-
sentation for the child is universally recognized. 157 In depen-
dency proceedings courts have required appointment of counsel 
for the child once the government alleges that a home is un-
fit.158 Without independent representation, "plea" bargaining 
or an agreement between parents and the government may 
155. See James R. Redeker, The Right of an Abused Child to Independent Coun· 
sel and the Role of the Child Advocate in Child Abuse Cases, 23 VILL. L. REV. 
521, 530 (1978) (arguing that independent counsel for the child should be required 
in any proceeding which may affect the child's custody or quality of life); see also 
Inker & Perretta, supra note 8, at 116·19 (maintaining that fair treatment reo 
quires a right to counsel when government action may seriously injure an individ· 
ual). 
156. State ex rel. Juv. Dept. of Multnomah County v. Wade, 527 P.2d 753, 757 
(Or. App. 1974) (requiring independent counsel for the child because the parent 
and government do not provide effective representation). 
157. See supra note 152. 
158. In re Melissa S., 225 Cal. Rptr. 195, 201·02 (Ct.App. 1986). Counsel contino 
ues until relieved by the court. Id. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(e) (West Supp. 
1995) provides in relevant part: 
Id. 
The counsel for the minor shall be charged in general 
with the representation of the minor's interests. To that 
end, the counsel shall make . . . further investigations 
that he or she deems in good faith to be reasonably nec· 
essary to ascertain the facts, including the interviewing of 
witnesses, and he or she shall examine and cross·examine 
witnesses in both the adjudicatory and dispositional hear· 
ings. He or she may also introduce and examine his or 
her own witnesses, make recommendations to the court 
concerning the child's welfare, and participate further in 
the proceedings to the degree necessary to adequately 
represent the minor . . . . In addition, counsel shall in· 
vestigate the interests of the child beyond the scope of 
the juvenile proceeding and report to the court other 
interests of the minor that may need to be protected by 
the institution of other administrative or judicial proceed· 
ings .... 
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disadvantage the child's best interests.159 
When abuse is alleged in a private custody dispute, termi-
nation or severe restriction of custody and visitation is often 
sought. Because the child's need for representation in parental 
termination proceedings is well established/60 even if not rec-
ognized as a due process right, this interest should extend to 
private proceedings which involve the same conflicts and have 
the same consequences. The child's interest in a continuing 
relationship with a parent is no less important when another 
parent, rather than the state, seeks to effectively terminate 
that relationship. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Juvenile courts, which provide direct representation for 
the child, were designed to handle dependency and termination 
cases involving parental abuse of children.161 Unfortunately, 
family courts, designed to decide custody between parents, are 
increasingly forced to deal with allegations of child abuse. 162 
Under these conditions, divorce custody proceedings represent 
an important opportunity for the state to protect the child 
when dependency or termination hearings are not initiated or 
are dismissed for insufficient evidence. 163 Even when the 
"best interests of the child" standard explicitly includes a histo-
ry of child abuse as a factor in determining custody and visita-
tion, "substantial corroboration" may be required. 164 Corrobo-
Id. 
159. In re Melissa S., 225 Cal. Rptr. at 203. In Melissa S., the court found: 
When a welfare department's social worker has recom-
mended a minor be made a dependent child and removed 
from parental custody, and when a parent has entered 
into a "plea" arrangement, conceivably to preclude 
adjudication of the more serious acts alleged in the peti-
tion, both the welfare department and the parent may 
have an interest in letting the allegations of the petition 
and the substance of the report pass unchallenged. This 
does not, however, assure that the best interestS of the 
minor are being served, precisely the reason that indepen-
dent counsel is statutorily required. 
160. See supra note 152. 
161. Edwards, supra note 65, at 204. 
162. See id. 
163. See id. at 269. 
164. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994) (requiring substantial independent 
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ration may be lacking, however, because often the child is not 
adequately represented and evidence of abuse is not fully ex-
plored. Appellate courts must depend upon trial courts to de-
velop a factual record concerning both the allegations of abuse 
and the existence of adequate representation for the child. 
Consequently, the legislatures and courts of several states 
have recognized that allegations of child abuse require manda-
tory appointment of a representative for the child.165 
Although states may resist adding another participant to 
an already complex proceeding, protection of the child's due 
process right to a custody decision that ensures his or her 
safety requires imposing upon the courts a "bright-line" rule 
for appointment of counsel. When allegations of child abuse 
cloud a custody proceeding, an initial case-by-case judicial 
determination of the adequacy of the child's representation by 
others is too problematic. Children's need for independent 
representation in dependency and termination proceedings, 
where their interests are similarly threatened, is universally 
acknowledged. Giving children the equivalent opportunity to 
be heard through appointment of counsel in divorce custody 
proceedings will accomplish the procedural regularity which 
due process principles demand. 
David Peterson· 
corroboration for consideration of child abuse or spousal abuse in custody deci-
sions). 
165. See supra notes 78-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
states. When the court has reason to appoint counsel for the child, the child's 
counsel implicitly has standing to challenge all matters dealing with him or her. 
Lapides v. Lapides, 437 A.2d 251, 254 (Md. App. 1981). The court's appointment of 
counsel presumes that the parents cannot provide the minor proper representation. 
Id.; see also In re Benjamin D., 278 Cal. Rptr. 468, 473 (Ct. App. 1991) (consider-
ing minor's lack of counsel at a custody hearing a factor in relitigating abuse 
charges at a protection hearing). . 
'" Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995. 
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